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This study empirically analyzes the historical performance of 
defaulted debt from Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database 
(1987-2010). Motivated by a stylized structural model of 
credit risk with systematic recovery risk, we argue and find 
evidence that returns on defaulted debt covary with determi-
nants of the market risk premium, firm specific and structural 
factors. Defaulted debt returns in our sample are observed 
to be increasing in collateral quality or debt cushion of the 
issue. Returns are also increasing for issuers having supe-
rior ratings at origination, more leverage at default, higher 
cumulative abnormal returns on equity prior to default, or 
greater market implied loss severity at default. Considering 
systematic factors, returns on defaulted debt are positively 
related to equity market indices and industry default rates. 
On the other hand, defaulted debt returns decrease with 
short-term interest rates. In a rolling out-of-time and out-
of-sample resampling experiment we show that our leading 
model exhibits superior performance. We also document 
the economic significance of these results through excess 
abnormal returns, implementing a hypothetical trading strat-
egy, of around 5-6 percent (2-3 percent) assuming zero (1bp 
per month) round-trip transaction costs. These results are 
of practical relevance to investors and risk managers in this 
segment of the fixed income market.
Michael Jacobs, Jr. — Senior Financial Economist, Credit Risk Analysis Division, Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency1
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily  1 
represent a position taken by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
or the U.S. Department of the Treasury.60
There exists an economic argument that to the extent there may be op-
portunity costs associated with holding defaulted debt, and that the per-
formance of such debt may vary systematically, the required return on 
the defaulted instruments should include an appropriate risk premium. 
Thus far, most research studying systematic variation in defaulted debt 
recoveries has focused on the influence of either macroeconomic fac-
tors [Frye (2000 a,b,c; 2003), Hu and Perraudin (2002) Cary and Gordy 
(2007), Jacobs (2011)], supply/demand conditions in the defaulted debt 
markets [Altman et al. (2003)], or some combination thereof [Jacobs and 
Karagozoglu, (2011)]. Probably the reason for this focus is the conven-
tional wisdom that determinants of recoveries (i.e., collateral values) are 
thought covary with such systematic macroeconomic measures. How-
ever, the results concerning systematic variation in recoveries have been 
mixed. We believe that this is due to the unmeasured factors influencing 
the market risk premium for defaulted debt. Adequately controlling for 
other  determinants  of  defaulted  debt  performance,  potentially  imper-
fectly correlated with standard macroeconomic indicators, is critical to 
understanding this.
We propose to extend this literature in several ways. First, we quantify 
the systematic variation in defaulted debt returns with respect to factors 
which influence the market risk premium for defaulted debt, which are 
related to investors’ risk aversion or investment opportunity sets; in the 
process, we specify a simple stylized model of credit risk in structural 
framework [Merton (1974)], having testable implications that are inves-
tigated herein. Second, we are able to analyze defaulted debt perfor-
mance in segments homogenous with respect to recovery risk, through 
controlling for both firm and instrument specific covariates, and examine 
whether these are associated with recoveries on defaulted debt securi-
ties. Third, departing from most of the prior literature on recoveries, hav-
ing predominantly focused on measures around the time of default or 
at settlement, we will be studying the relationship amongst these in the 
form of returns. We believe that such focus is most relevant to market 
participants – both for traders and buy-and-hold investors (i.e., vulture 
funds, or financial institutions managing defaulted portfolios) – since this 
is an accepted measure of economic gain or loss. Finally, we are able to 
build parsimonious and robust econometric models, in the generalized 
linear model (GLM) class, that are capable of explaining and predicting 
defaulted debt returns, and we use these to construct trading strategies 
demonstrating their economic significance.
In this study, we quantify the performance of defaulted debt relative to 
the previously and newly proposed determinants of corporate debt re-
coveries, through a comprehensive analysis of the returns on this asset 
class. The dataset that we utilize, Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database™ 
(MURD™), contains the market prices of defaulted bonds and loans near 
the time of default, and the prices of these instruments (or market value 
of the bundle of instruments) received in settlement (or at the resolution) 
of default. We have such data for 550 obligors and 1368 bonds and loans 
in the period 1987-2010. We examine the distributional properties of the 
individual annualized rates of return on defaulted debt across different 
segmentations in the dataset (i.e., default type, facility type, time period, 
seniority, collateral, original rating, industry), build econometric models to 
explain observed returns, and quantify potential trading gains to deploy-
ing such models.
Our principle results are as follows. We find returns to be in line with 
(albeit to the upper end of the range of results) what has been found in 
the previous literature, a mean of 28.6 percent.3 We find returns on de-
faulted debt to vary significantly according to contractual, obligor, equity/
debt markets, and economic factors. At the facility structure level, there 
is some evidence that returns are elevated for defaulted debt having bet-
ter collateral quality rank or better protected tranches within the capital 
structure. At the obligor or firm level, returns are elevated for obligors 
rated higher at origination, more financially levered at default, or hav-
ing higher cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on equity prior to default. 
However, we also find returns to be increasing in the market implied loss 
severity at default. We also find evidence that while defaulted debt returns 
vary counter to the credit cycle, as they increase with industry default 
rates, they also increase with aggregate equity market returns. Further, 
we observe that short-term interest rates are inversely related to returns 
on defaulted debt. Finally, we document the economic significance of 
these results through excess abnormal returns, in a debt-equity arbitrage 
trading experiment, of around 5-6 percent (2-3 percent) assuming zero 
(1bp per month) round-trip transaction costs.
In addition to the relevance of this research for resolving questions in the 
finance of distressed debt investing, and aiding practitioners in this space, 
our results have implications for recently implemented supervisory Basel II 
capital standards for financial institutions [BCBS (2004)]. Our results indi-
cate that time variation in the market risk premium for defaulted debt may 
be an important systematic factor influencing recoveries on such instru-
ments (and by implication, their loss-given-default – LGD), which is likely 
to not be perfectly correlated with the business cycle. Hence, any financial 
institution, in making the decision about how much capital to hold as a 
safeguard against losses on corporate debt securities, should take into ac-
count factors such as the systematic variation in investor risk aversion and 
Standard portfolio separation theory implies that, all else equal, during episodes of  2 
augmented investor risk aversion, a greater proportion of wealth is allocated to risk-
free assets [Tobin (1958), Merton (1971)], implying lessened demand, lower price, and 
augmented expected returns across all risky assets.
The probable reason why we are closer to the higher end of estimates, such as Keenan et  3 
al (2000), is that we have included several downturn periods, such as the early 1990s and 
recently.61
investment opportunity sets.4 Indeed, Basel II requires that banks quantify 
“downturn effects” in LGD estimation [BCBS (2005, 2006)], and for the 
relevant kind of portfolio (i.e., large corporate borrowers having marketable 
debt), and our research provides some guidance in this regard.
Review of the related literature
Altman (1989) develops a methodology – at the time new to finance – for 
the measurement of risk due to default, suggesting a means of ranking 
fixed-income performance over a range of credit-quality segments. This 
technique measures the expected mortality of bonds, and associated 
loss rates, similarly to actuarial tabulations that assess human mortality 
risk. Results demonstrate outperformance by risky bonds relative to risk-
less Treasuries over a ten-year horizon and that, despite relatively high 
mortality rates, B-rated and CCC-rated securities outperform all other 
rating categories in the first four years after issuance, with BB-rated se-
curities outperforming all others thereafter.
Gilson (1995) surveys the market practices of so-called “vulture investors,” 
noting that as the risks of such an investment style exposes one to a high 
level of idiosyncratic and non-diversifiable risk, those who succeed in this 
space must have a mastery of legal rules and institutional setting that gov-
ern corporate bankruptcy. The author further argues that such mastery can 
result in very high returns. Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997) study the func-
tion of this investor class in the governance and reorganization of defaulted 
firms using a sample of 288 public debt defaults. They attribute better rela-
tive operating performance after default to vulture investors gaining control 
of the target firm in either a senior executive or an ownership role. They 
also find positive abnormal returns for the defaulted firm’s equity or debt 
in the two days surrounding the public revelation of a vulture purchase of 
such instruments. The authors conclude that vulture investors add value 
by disciplining managers of distressed firms.
The historical performance of the Moody’s Corporate Bond index [Keenan 
et al. (2000)] shows an annualized return of 17.4 percent in the period 
1982-2000. However, this return has been extremely volatile, as most of 
this gain (147 percent) occurred in the period 1992-1996. Keenan et al. 
(2000) and Altman and Jha (2003) both arrive at estimates of a correlation 
to the market on this defaulted loan index of about 20 percent, implying a 
market risk premium of 216 bps. Davydenko and Strebuleav (2002) report 
similar results for non-defaulted high-yield corporate bonds (BB rated) in 
the period 1994-1999.
From the perspective of viewing defaulted debt as an asset class, Guha 
(2003) documents a convergence in market value as a proportion of par 
with respect to bonds of equal priority in bankruptcy approaching de-
fault. This holds regardless of contractual features, such as contractual 
rate or remaining time-to-maturity. The implication is that while prior to 
default bonds are valued under uncertain timing of and recovery in the 
event of default, that varies across issues according to both borrower 
and instrument characteristics. Upon default such expectations become 
one and the same for issues of the same ranking. There is cross-sectional 
variation in yields is due to varied perceived default risk as well as instru-
ment structures, but as default approaches the claim on the debt col-
lapses to a common claim on the expected share of emergence value 
of the firm’s assets due to the creditor class. Consequently, the contract 
rate on the debt pre-default is no longer the relevant valuation metric with 
respect to restructured assets. This was predicted by the Merton (1974) 
theoretical framework that credit spreads on a firm’s debt approach the 
expected rate of return on the firm’s assets, as leverage increases to the 
point when the creditors become the owners of the firm. Schuermann 
(2003) echoed the implications of this argument by claiming that cash 
flows post-default represent a new asset.
Altman and Jha (2003), regressing the Altman/Solomon Center defaulted 
bond index on the S&P 500 returns for the period 1986-2002, come up 
with an 11.1 percent required return (based upon a 20.3 percent correla-
tion estimate.) Altman et al. (2003) examine the determinants of recover-
ies on defaulted bonds, in a setting of systematic variation in aggregate 
recovery risk, based on market values of defaulted debt securities shortly 
following default. The authors find that the aggregate supply of defaulted 
debt securities, which tends to increase in downturn periods, is a key de-
terminant of aggregate as well as instrument level recovery rates. The au-
thors’ results suggest that while systematic macroeconomic performance 
may be associated with elevated LGD, the principle mechanism by which 
this operates is through supply and demand conditions in the distressed 
debt markets. More recently, Altman (2010) reports that the Altman-NYU 
Salomon Center Index of defaulted bonds (bank loans) returned 12.6 per-
cent (3.4 percent) over the period 1986-2009 (1989-2009).
Machlachlan (2004), in the context of proposing an appropriate discount 
rate for workout recoveries for regulatory purposes in estimating economic 
LGD [BCBS (2005)], outlines a framework that is motivated by a single 
factor CAPM model and obtains similar results in two empirical exercises. 
First, regressing Altman-NYU Salomon Center Index of Defaulted Public 
Bonds in the period 1987-2002 on the S&P 500 equity index, he obtains a 
20 percent correlation, implying a market risk premium (MRP) of 216 bps. 
Second, he looks at monthly secondary market bid quotes for the period 
April 2002-August 2003, obtaining a beta estimate of 0.37, which accord-
ing to the Frye (2000c) extension of the Basel single factor framework, 
implies a recovery value correlation of 0.21 and an MRP of 224 bps.
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Our research also has a bearing on the related and timely issue of the debate about the  4 
so-called “pro-cyclicality” of the Basel capital framework [Gordy ( 2003)], an especially 
relevant topic in the wake of the recent financial crisis, where a critique of the regulation is 
such that banks wind up setting aside more capital just at the time that they should be using 
capital to provide more credit to businesses or to increase their own liquidity positions, in 
order to help avoid further financial dislocations and help revitalize the economy.62
Finally, considering studies of recovery rates (orLGDs), Acharya et al. 
(2007) examine the empirical determinants of ultimate LGD at the instru-
ment level, and find that the relationship between the aggregate supply 
of defaulted debt securities and recoveries does not hold after controlling 
for industry level distress. They argue for a “fire-sale effect” that results 
when most firms in a troubled industry may be selling collateral at the 
same time. These authors’ results imply that systematic macroeconomic 
performance may not be a sole or critical determinant of recovery rates 
on defaulted corporate debt. Carey and Gordy (2007) examine whether 
there is systematic variation in ultimate recoveries at the obligor (firm-
level default incidence) level, and find only weak evidence of system-
atic variation in recoveries. Recently, building upon these two studies, 
Jacobs and Karagozoglu (2011) empirically investigate the determinants 
of LGD and build alternative predictive econometric models for LGD on 
bonds and loans using an extensive sample of most major U.S. defaults 
in the period 1985–2008. They build a simultaneous equation model in 
the beta-link generalized linear model (BLGLM) class, identifying several 
that perform well in terms of the quality of estimated parameters as well 
as overall model performance metrics. This extends prior work by model-
ing LGD both at the firm and the instrument levels. In a departure from 
the extant literature, the authors find the economic and statistical sig-
nificance of firm-specific, debt, and equity-market variables; in particular, 
that information from either the equity or the debt markets at around the 
time of default (measures of either distress debt prices or cumulative 
equity returns, respectively) have predictive powers with respect to the 
ultimate LGD, which is in line with recent recovery and asset pricing re-
search. They also document a new finding, that larger firms (loans) have 
significantly lower (higher) LGDs.
Theoretical framework
In this section we lay out the theoretical basis for returns on post-default 
recoveries, denoted rs
D, where s denotes a recovery segment (i.e., senior-
ity classes, collateral types, etc.). Following an intertemporal version of 
the structural modelling framework for credit risk [(Merton (1971), Vasicek 
(1987, 2002)5], we may write the stochastic process describing the instan-
taneous evolution of the ith firm’s5 asset returns at time t as: dVi,t/Vi,t = µidt 
+ σiWi,t (1), where Vi,t is the asset value, σi is the return volatility, µi is the 
drift (which can be taken to be the risk-free rate r under risk-neutral mea-
sure), and Wi,t is a standard Weiner process that decomposes as (this is 
also known as a standardized asset return): dWi,t = ρi,XdXt + (1- ρ2
i,X)1/2 
dZi,t (2), where the processes (also standard Weiners) Xt and Zi,t are the 
systematic risk factors (or standardized asset returns) and the idiosyncratic 
(or firm-specific) risk factors, respectively; and the factor loading ρi,X is 
constant across all firms in a PD segment homogenous with respect to 
default risk (or across time for the representative firm).7 It follows that the 
instantaneous asset-value correlation amongst firms (or segments) i and j 
is given by: 1/dt · Cor
V
i,j [dVi,t/Vi,t , dVj,t/Vj,t] = ρi,Xρj,X (3).
Defining the recovery rate on the ith defaulted asset8 at time t as Ri,t, we 




i,t (4), where µi
R is the drift (which can be taken to 
be the expected instantaneous return on collateral under physical mea-
sure, or the risk-free rate under risk-neutral measure), σi
R is the volatility 
of the collateral return, and WR
i,t is a standard Weiner process that for re-
covery segment SR decomposes as: dWR
i,t = ρi,sR dXt
R + (1 – ρ2
i,sR)1/2 dZR
i,t 
(5), where the two-systematic factors are bivariate standard normal, each 
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This set-up follows various extensions of the structural model framework 
for systematic recovery risk. What they have in common is that they allow 
the recovery process to depend upon a second systematic factor, which 
may be correlated with the macro (or market) factor Xt [Frye (2000 a, b, 
c), Pyktin (2003), Dullman and Trapp (2004), Giese (2005), Rosch and 
Scheule (2005), Hillebrand (2006), Barco (2007), Jacobs (2011)]. In this 
general and more realistic framework, returns on defaulted debt may be 
governed by a stochastic process distinct from that of the firm. This is 
the case where the asset is secured by cash, third party guarantees, or 
assets not used in production. In this setting, it is possible that there are 
two salient notions of asset value correlation, one driving the correlation 
amongst defaults, and another driving the correlation between collateral 
values and the returns on defaulted assets in equilibrium. This reasoning 
implies that it is entirely conceivable that, especially in complex bank-
ing facilities, cash flows associated with different sources of repayment 
should be discounted differentially according to their level of systematic 
risk. In not distinguishing how betas may differ between defaulted instru-
ments secured differently, it is quite probable that investors in distressed 
debt may misprice such assets.
It is common to assume that the factor loading in (5) is constant amongst 
debt instruments within specified recovery segments, so that the recov-
ery-value correlation for segment SR is given by ρ2
i,sR ≡ RsR.9 If we take 
the further step of identifying this correlation with the correlation to a 
market portfolio – arguably a reasonable interpretation in the asymptotic 
Note that this is also the approach underlying the regulatory capital formulae [BCBS (2003)],  5 
as developed by Gordy (2003).
This could also be interpreted as the ith PD segment or an obligor rating. 6 
Vasicek (2002) demonstrates that under the assumption of a single systematic factor, an  7 
infinitely granular credit portfolio, and LGD that does not vary systematically, a closed-form 
solution for capital exists that is invariant to portfolio composition.
We can interpret this as an LGD segment (or rating) or debt seniority class. 8 
Indeed, for many asset classes the Basel II framework mandates constant correlation  9 
parameters equally across all banks, regardless of particular portfolio exposure to industry 
or geography. However, for certain exposures, such as wholesale non-high volatility 
commercial real estate, this is allowed to depend upon the PD for the segment or rating 
[BCBS (2004]).63
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single risk-factor (ASRF) framework [(Vasicek (1987), Gordy (2003)] – then 
we can write R2
sR = ρ2
sR
,M. It then follows from the standard capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) that the relationship between the defaulted debt 
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Where σM is volatility of the market return. We may now conclude that in 
this setting the return on defaulted debt on the sth exposure (or segment) 
rs
D is equal to the expected return on the collateral, which is given by the 
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Where the market risk premium is given by MRP ≡ rM – rrf (also assumed 
to be constant through time) and the debt-specific risk premium is given 
by δsR = βsR
,MMRP. This approach identifies the systematic factor with the 
standardized return on a market portfolio rM, from which it follows that 
the asset correlation to the former can be interpreted as a normalized 
“beta” in a single factor CAPM (or just a correlation between the de-
faulted debt’s and the market’s return), which is given by ρi,sR ≡ (RsR)1/2. 
In subsequent sections, we pursue alternative estimations ρ ˆ i,sR, through 
regressing actual defaulted debt returns on some kind of market factor 
or other measure of systematic risk (i.e., aggregate default rates),10 while 
controlling for firm or instrument specific covariates.
Empirical methodology
We adopt a simple measure, motivated in part by the availability of a rich 
dataset of defaulted bonds and loans available to us, which analyzes the 
observable market prices of debt at two points in time: the default event 
(i.e., bankruptcy or other financial distress qualifying as a default) and the 
resolution of the default event (i.e., emergence from bankruptcy under 
Chapter 11 or liquidation under Chapter 7). We calculate the annualized 









































ijt P ) are the prices of debt at time of default ti,j
D (emer-
gence ti,j
E ). An estimate for the return, the jth segment (seniority class of 
collateral type), can then be formed as the arithmetic average across the 































D is the number of defaulted loans in the recovery group j. A 
measure of the recovery uncertainty in recovery class s is given by the 
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Empirical results: summary statistics of returns on 
defaulted debt by segment
In this section and the following, we document our empirical results. 
These are based upon our analysis of defaulted bonds and loans in the 
Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database™ (MURD™) release as of August, 
2010. This contains the market values of defaulted instruments at or near 
the time of default,11 as well as the values of such pre-petition instruments 
(or of instruments received in settlement) at the time of default resolution. 
This database is largely representative of the U.S. large-corporate loss 
experience, from the late 1980s to the present, including most of the 
major corporate bankruptcies occurring in this period.
Table A1, in the Appendix, summarizes basic characteristics of simple 
annualized return on defaulted debt (RDD) in (10) by default event type 
(bankruptcy under Chapter 11 versus out-of-court settlement) and instru-
ment type (loans – broken down by term and revolving versus bonds). 
Here we also show the means and standard deviations of two other 
key quantities: the time-to-resolution (i.e., time from default to time of 
resolution) and the outstanding-at-default, for both the RDD sample as 
well as for the entire MURD™ database (i.e., including instruments not 
having trading prices at default). We conclude from this that our sample 
is for the most part representative of the broader database. Across all 
instruments, average time-to-resolution is 1.6 (1.4) years and average 
outstanding at default is U.S.$216.4M (U.S.$151.7M) for the analysis 
(broader) samples.
Alternatively, we can estimate the vector of parameters ( 10  µ, µi
R, ρi,s, ρi,sR, r)
T by full-
information maximum likelihood (FIML), given a time series of default rates and realized 
recovery rates. The resulting estimate ρ ˆ i,sR can be used in equation (8) – in conjunction with 
estimates of the market volatility σM, debt-specific volatility σi
R, the MRP (rM – rf), and the 
risk-free rate rf – in order to derive the theoretical return on defaulted debt within this model 
[Machlachlan (2004)]. Also see Jacobs [2011] for how these quantities can be estimated 
from prices of defaulted debt at default and at emergence of different seniority instruments.
Experts at Moody compute an average of trading prices from 30 to 45 days following the  11 
default event, where each daily observation is the mean price polled from a set of dealers 
with the minimum/maximum quote thrown out.64
The bottom panel of Table A1 represents the entire Moody’s database, 
whereas the top panel summarizes the subset for which we can calcu-
late RDD measures. The version of MURD™ that we use contains 4,050 
defaulted instruments, 3,500 (or 86.4 percent) of which are bankruptcies, 
and the remaining 550 are distressed restructurings. On the other hand, 
in the RDD subset, the vast majority (94.6 percent or 1,322) of the total 
(1,398) are Chapter 11. One reason for this is that the times-to-resolution 
of the out-of-court settlements are so short (about 2 months on average) 
that it is more likely that post-default trading prices at 30-45 days from 
default are not available. Second, many of these were extreme values 
of RDD, and were heavily represented in the outliers that we chose to 
exclude from the analysis (30 of 35 statistical outliers).12
The overall average of the 1,398 annualized RDDs is 28.6 percent, with a 
standard error of the mean of 3.1 percent, and ranging widely from -100 
percent to 893.8 percent. This suggests that there were some very high 
returns – as the 95th percentile of the RDD distributions is 191 percent, 
or that in well over 70 cases investors would have more than doubled 
their money holding defaulted debt. We can observe this in Figure 1, 
the distribution of RDD, which has an extremely long tail to the right. We 
observe that the distribution of RDD is somewhat different in the case 
of out-of-court settlements as compared to bankruptcies, with respec-
tive mean RDDs of 37.3 percent for the former, and 28.1 percent in the 
latter. The standard errors of mean RDDs are also much higher in the 
non-bankruptcy population, 15.3 percent for out-of-court versus 3.2 per-
cent for bankruptcies. The data is well-represented by bank loans, 36.8 
percent (38.1 percent) of the RDD total MURD™ sample, or 514 (1543) 
out of 1398 (4050) instruments. Loans appear to behave somewhat dif-
ferently than bonds, having slightly higher mean and standard error of 
mean RDDs, 32.1 percent and 26.4 percent, respectively.
Table A2 summarizes the distributional properties of RDD by senior-
ity rankings (bank loans; senior secured, unsecured and subordinated 
bonds; and junior subordinated bonds) and collateral types.13 Generally, 
since this does not hold monotonically across collateral classes or is con-
sistent across recovery risk measures, better secured or higher ranked 
instruments exhibit superior post-default return performance. However, 
while the standard error of mean RDD (which we can argue reflects re-
covery uncertainty) tends to be lower for more senior instruments, it 
tends to be higher for those which are better secured. Average RDD is 
significantly higher for secured as compared to unsecured facilities, 34.5 
percent versus 23.6 percent respectively. Focusing on bank loans, we 
see a wider split of 33.0 percent versus 19.8 percent for secured and 
unsecured, respectively. However, by broad measures of seniority rank-
ing, mean RDD exhibits a non-monotonic increasing pattern in seniority, 
while the standard error of RDD is decreasing in seniority. Average RDD 
is 32.3 percent and 36.6 percent for loans and senior secured bonds, as 
compared to 23.7 percent and 33.2 percent for senior secured and senior 
subordinated bonds, decreasing to 15.6 percent for junior subordinated 
instruments. However, while unsecured loans have lower post-default 
Based upon extensive data analysis in the Robust Statistics package of the S-Plus  12 
statistical computing application, we determined 35 observations to be statistical outliers. 
The optimal cutoff was determined to be about 1,000%, above which we removed the 
observation from subsequent calculations. There was a clear separation in the distributions, 
as the minimum RDD in the outlier subset is about 17,000%, more than double the 
maximum in the non-outlier subset.
We have two sets of collateral types: the 19 lowest level labels appearing in MURD™  13 
(Guarantees, Oil and Gas Properties, Inventory and Accounts Receivable, Accounts 
Receivable, Cash, Inventory, Most Assets, Equipment, All Assets, Real Estate, All Non-
current Assets, Capital Stock, PP&E, Second Lien, Other, Unsecured, Third Lien, Intellectual 
Property and Intercompany Debt), and a six level high level grouping of that we constructed 
from the (Cash, Accounts Receivables & Guarantees; Inventory, Most Assets & Equipment; 
All Assets & Real Estate; Non-Current Assets & Capital Stock; PP&E & Second Lien; and 
Unsecured & Other Illiquid Collateral). The latter high-level groupings were developed with 
in consultation with recovery analysis experts at Moody’s Investors Services.
Quintiles of time from default to resolution date





































1 64.19 24.57 25.75 26.11 38.32 13.54 29.75 14.08 -4.99 9.21 35.04 9.66
2 22.10 15.41 38.34 17.09 28.24 19.03 26.69 9.21 8.23 6.82 25.93 6.78
3 20.81 12.16 30.55 18.16 10.04 8.12 27.19 11.21 8.90 5.06 19.28 5.26
4 91.53 31.75 41.38 19.92 19.79 9.16 23.55 6.26 8.96 3.91 28.67 5.51
5 92.08 34.68 57.99 20.85 8.82 8.21 34.22 20.16 -2.97 8.57 38.32 9.23
Total 58.90 11.57 39.71 8.89 20.02 5.71 27.32 4.99 6.03 2.61 28.56 3.11
Table 1 – Returns on defaulted debt (RDD)1 of defaulted instruments by quintiles of time-to-resolution (TTR)2 and time-in-distress (TID)3 from last cash pay to 
default date (Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database 1987-2010)
1 – Annualized “return on defaulted debt” from just after the time of default (first trading date of debt) until the time of ultimate resolution.
2 – TTR: Duration in years from the date of default (bankruptcy filing or other default) to the date of resolution (emergence from bankruptcy or other settlement).
3 – TID: Duration in years from the date of the last interest payment to the date of default (bankruptcy filing or other default).65
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returns than secured loans, within the secured loan class we find that 
returns exhibit a humped pattern as collateral quality goes down in rank, 
an increase in RDD from 22.6 percent for cash, to 46.2 percent for “All 
assets and real estate,” to 29.0 percent for “PP&E and second lien.”
Table 1 summarizes RDDs by two duration measures: the “time-in-dis-
tress” (TID), defined as the time (in years) from the last cash pay date to 
the default state, and the “time-to-resolution” (TTR), the duration from 
the date of default to the resolution or settlement date. Analysis of these 
measures helps us to understand the term-structure of the defaulted 
debt returns. We examine features of RDD by quintiles of the TTR and 
TID distributions, where the first refers to the bottom fifth of durations in 
length, and the fifth quintile the top longest. The patterns we observe are 
that RDD is decreasing (albeit non-monotonically) in TTR, while it exhibits 
a U-shape in TID.
Table 2 summarizes RDD by the earliest available Moody’s senior un-
secured credit rating for the obligor. This provides some evidence that 
returns on defaulted debt are augmented for defaulted obligors that had, 
at origination (or time of first public rating), better credit ratings or higher 
credit quality. Mean RDD generally declines as credit ratings worsen, al-
beit unevenly. While the average is 22.9 percent for the AA-A category, it 
goes up to 45.1 percent for BBB, then down to 17.9 percent for BB, but 
up again to 31.6 percent for B, and finally down to 21.99 percent for the 
lowest category CC-CCC.
Table 3 summarizes RDD by measures of the relative debt cushion of the 
defaulted instrument. MURDTM provides the proportion of debt either 
above (degree of subordination) or below (debt cushion) any defaulted in-
strument, according to the seniority rank of the class to which the instru-
ment belongs. It has been shown that the greater the level of debt below, 
or the less debt above, the better the ultimate recovery on the defaulted 
debt [Keisman et al. (2000)]. We can also think of this position in the 
capital structure in terms of “tranche safety” – the less debt above, more 
debt below, then the more likely it is that there will be some recovery. 
While this is not the entire story, this measure has been demonstrated to 
be an important determinant of ultimate recovery, so we suspect that it 
will have some bearing on the performance of defaulted debt. Here, we 
offer evidence that returns on defaulted debt are increasing in the degree 
of tranche safety, or relative debt cushion, as measured by the difference 
between debt below and debt above. To this end, we define the tranche 
safety index (TSI) as:
TSI ≡ ½[%debt below – %debt above + 1]  (12)
This ranges between zero and 1. When it is near zero the difference be-
tween the debt above and below is greatest (i.e., the thinnest tranche or 
the most subordinated), and closest to unity when debt below is maximized 
and the debt above is nil (i.e., the thickest tranche or the greatest debt 
cushion). In Table 3, we examine the quintiles of the TSI, where the bottom 
20th percentile of the TSI distribution represents the least protected instru-
ments, and the top 20th percentile the most protected. Additionally, we 
define several dummy variables in order to capture this phenomenon, as 
in Brady et al. (2006). “No debt above and some debt below” (NDA/SDB) 
represents a group that should be the best protected, while “Some debt 
above and some debt below” (SDA/SDB) and “No debt above and no debt 
below” (NDA/NDB) represent intermediate groups, and “No debt below 






AA-A 146 22.94% 5.04%
BBB 586 45.09% 13.25%
BB 285 17.92% 5.24%
B 65 31.57% 5.66%







Total 1398 28.56% 3.34%
Table 2 – Returns on defaulted debt1 of defaulted instruments by credit 
rating at origination (Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database 1987-2010)
1 –   Annualized “Return on defaulted debt” (RDD) from just after the time of default 








1st quintile TSI 172 35.06% 12.88%
2nd quintile TSI 373 10.98% 4.85%
3rd quintile TSI 413 25.77% 5.40%
4th quintile TSI 342 42.41% 6.33%
5th quintile TSI 98 47.48% 9.57%
NDA / SDB1 449 42.77% 4.89%
SDA / SDB2 259 24.06% 7.65%
NDA / NDB3 164 25.23% 9.44%
NDB / SDA4 526 19.67% 5.25%
Total 1398 28.56% 3.11%
1 – No debt above and some debt below.
2 – Some debt above and some debt below.
3 – No debt above and no debt below.
4 – No debt below and some debt above.
Table 3 – Returns on defaulted debt5 of defaulted instruments by Tranche 
Safety Index6 (TSI) quintiles and categories (Moody’s Ultimate Recovery 
Database 1987-2010)
5 –   Annualized “return on defaulted debt” (RDD) from just after the time of default 
(first trading date of debt) until the time of ultimate resolution.
6 –   An index of the tranche safety calculated as TTS = (% debt below – % debt above + 1)/2.66
total assets. Results show generally a negative correlation between cash 
flow ratios and RDD, notably a strong negative correlation for FAR of 9.0 
percent. The intuition here may be considered strained, as it is natural to 
think that the ability to throw off cash may signal a firm with an underlying 
business model that is viable, which is conducive to a successful emer-
gence from default and well performing debt; however, this may also be 
taken to mean an “excess” of cash with not good investments to apply it 
to and a basically poor economic position.
Finally for the financials, we have a set of variables that measure some no-
tion of accounting profitability: net income/book value of total assets, net 
income/market value of total assets, retained earnings/book value of total 
assets, return on assets, and return on equity. These have generally a mod-
est inverse relation to RDD. As with other dimensions of risk considered 
here, we resort to a “backward story,” relative to the expectation that least-
bad profitability mitigates credit or default risk: that is, if already in default, 
then better accounting profitability may be a harbinger of deeper woes for 
the firm, as reflected in the better returns on the debt from default to reso-
lution of default. However, none of these enter the multiple regressions.
Equity price performance metrics were extracted from CRSP at the 
date nearest to the first default date of the obligor, but no nearer than 
on month to default. These are shown in the second from top panel of 
Table A3. The 1-month equity price volatility, the standard deviation of 
daily equity returns in the month prior to default, exhibits a small modest 
positive correlation of 2.5 percent to RDD. This sign is explainable by an 
option theoretic view of recoveries, since the value of a call-option on the 
residual cash flows of the firms to creditors are expected to increase in 
asset value volatility, which is reflected to some degree in equity volatility. 
On the other hand, the one-year expected equity return, defined as the 
average return on the obligor’s stock in excess of the risk-free rate the 
year prior to default, exhibits a modest degree of negative correlation 
(-6.4 percent) which we find to be somewhat puzzling. The cumulative 
abnormal returns on equity, the returns in excess of a market model in 
the 90 days prior to default, have the strongest positive relationship to 
RDD of the group, 10.3 percent. This is understandable, as the equity 
markets may have a reasonable forecast of the firm’s ability to become 
rehabilitated in the emergence from default, as reflected in “less poor” 
stock price performance relative to the market. Note this is one of two 
variables in this group that enters the candidate regression models, and 
is also the basis of our trading analysis. Market capitalization of the firm 
relative to the market as a whole, defined as the logarithm of the scaled 
market capitalization,14 also has a significant negative univariate corre-
lation to the RDD of -8.6 percent, and enters all of the regressions, as 
does CAR. We have no clear a priori expectation for this variable, as 
The scale factor is defined as the market capitalization of the stock exchange where the  14 
obligor trades times 10,000.
and some debt above” (NDB/SDA) should be the least protected group. 
Table 3 shows that there is there is U-shape overall in average RDD with 
respect to quintiles of TSI: starting at 35.1 percent at the bottom quintile, 
having a minimum in the second of 11.0 percent, and increasing thereafter 
to 25.8 percent, 42.3 percent and 47.5 percent at the top. With regards 
to the dummy variables, we observe a general decrease in average RDD, 
from the most to the least protected categories: 42.8 percent, 24.1 per-
cent, 25.2 percent, and 19.7 percent from NDA/SDB to NDB/SDA.
Summary statistics and distributional properties of 
covariates
In this section we first analyze the independent variables available to 
us and calculated from MURD™, as well as data attached to this from 
Compustat and CRSP, and then discuss a multivariate regression model 
to explain RDD. Table A3 in the Appendix summarizes the distributional 
properties of key covariates in our database and their univariate corre-
lations to RDD. We have grouped these into the following categories: 
financial statement and market valuation, equity price performance, capi-
tal structure, credit quality/credit market, instrument/contractual, macro/
cyclical, and durations/vintage.
The financial variables, alone or in conjunction with equity market met-
rics, are extracted from Compustat or CRSP. The Compustat variables 
are taken from the date nearest to the first instrument default of the ob-
ligor, but no nearer than one month, and no further than one year, to 
default. These are shown in the top panel of Table A3 in the Appendix. 
First, we see some evidence that leverage is positively related to RDD, 
suggesting that firms that were nearer to their “default points” prior to 
the event had defaulted debt that performed better over the resolution 
period, all else equal. This is according to an accounting measure, book 
value of total liabilities/book value of total assets, which has a substantial 
positive correlation of 17.2 percent.
Next, we consider a set of variables measuring the degree of market valu-
ation relative to stated value, or alternatively the degree of intangibility in 
assets: Tobin’s Q, market value of total assets/book value of total assets 
(MVTA/BVTA), book value of intangibles/book value of total assets, and the 
price/earnings ratio. In this group, there is evidence of a positive relation-
ship to the RDD, which is strongest by far for MVTA/BVTA, having a cor-
relation of 18.5 percent. This enters into some of our candidate regression 
models significantly, but not the final model chosen. We speculate that the 
intuition here is akin to a “growth stock effect” – such types of firms may 
have available a greater range of investment options, that when come to 
fruition result in better performance of the defaulted debt on average.
We display 3 covariates in Table A3 that measure the cash-flow gen-
erating ability of the entity: free asset ratio (FAR), free cash flow/book 
value of total assets, and the cash flow from operations/book value of 67
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perhaps we would expect larger companies to have the “resiliency” to 
better navigate financial distress, counter to what we are measuring. The 
stock price relative to the market, which is the percentile ranking or the 
absolute level of the stock price in the market, has a moderate negative 
correlation to RDD of -4.4 percent. As this variable is intended to capture 
the delisting effect when a stock price goes very low, we might expect the 
opposite sign on this correlation. Finally, the stock price trading range, 
defined as the stock price minus its three-year low divided by the differ-
ence between its three-year high and three-year low, is showing only a 
small negative correlation to RDD of -2.9 percent. This is another coun-
terintuitive result, as one might expect that when a stock is doing better 
than its recent range that it should be a higher quality firm whose debt 
might have a better performance in default, but the data is not showing 
that, or much less of any kind of relationship here.
Capital structure metrics, extracted from the MURD™ data at the default 
date of the obligor, are shown in the third from top panel of Table A3. The 
two measures of capital structure complexity, number of instruments (NI) 
and number of creditor classes (NCC), show an inverse relationship to 
defaulted debt performance. NI (NCC) has a modest negative correlation 
to RDD of -4.0 percent (-3.0 percent). We might expect a simpler capital 
structure to be conducive to favorable defaulted debt performance ac-
cording to a coordination story. Note that neither of these variables en-
ters the final regression models. While most companies in our database 
have relatively simple capital structures, with NI and NCC having medi-
ans of 6 and 2, respectively, there are some rather complex structures 
(the respective maxima are 80 and 7).
We have three variables in this group that measure the nature of debt compo-
sition: percent secured debt (PSCD), percent bank debt (PBD) and percent 
subordinated debt (PSBD). The typical firm in our database has approxi-
mately 40 percent to 50 percent of its debt either secured, subordinated, 
or bank funded. All of these exhibit moderate positive correlation to RDD 
of 8.8 percent, 9.4 percent, and 8.7 percent for PSCD, PBD, and PSBD, 
respectively. The result on PBD may be attributed to either a monitoring on 
the one hand, or alternatively an “optimal foreclosure boundary choice,” 
kind of story [Carey and Gordy (2007), Jacobs (2011)]. However, as with the 
complexity variables, none of these appear in the regression model.
The credit quality/credit market metrics were extracted from the MURD™ 
database and Compustat just before the default date of the obligor. These 
are shown in the fourth from top panel of Table A3. Two of the variables 
in this group have, what may seem to be at first glance, counterintuitive 
relationships to RDD. First, the Altman Z-Score, which is available in Com-
pustat, has a relatively large negative correlation of -8.8 percent (note that 
higher values of the Z-score indicate lower bankruptcy risk). Second, the 
LGD implied by the trading price at default, which forms the basis for the 
RDD calculation, exhibits a moderate positive correlation to RDD of 11.3 
percent. As this variable has been shown to have predictive power for ul-
timate LGD [Emery et al. (2007), Jacobs and Karagozoglu (2011)], at first 
glance this relationship may seem difficult to understand. But note that 
the same research demonstrates that LGD at default is also an upwardly 
biased estimate of ultimate LGD in some sense. Consequently, we might 
just as well expect the opposite relationship to hold, as intuitively it may be 
that otherwise high quality debt may perform better on average if it is (per-
haps unjustifiably) “beaten down.” Indeed, LGD enters all of our regression 
models with this sign, and as a more influential variable than suggested by 
this correlation, but the Z-score does not make it to any of our regression 
models. The remaining variables in this group are reflective of the Moody’s 
ratings at the first point that the debt is rated. These are the Moody’s Origi-
nal Credit Rating Investment Grade Dummy (MOCR-IG), Moody’s Original 
Credit Rating – Major Code (MOCR-MJC; i.e., numerical codes for whole 
rating classes), Moody’s Original Credit Rating – Minor Code (MOCR-MNC; 
i.e., numerical codes for notched rating classes) and Moody’s Long Run De-
fault Rate – Minor Code (MLRDR-MNC; i.e., empirical default rates associ-
ated with notched rating classes). The only meaningful univariate result here 
is the small positive correlation of 2.4 percent in the case of MOCR-IG. This 
variable enters significantly into all of our candidate regression models.
Next we consider instrument/contractual metrics, extracted from the 
MURD™ database at the default date of the obligor. These are shown in 
the third from bottom panel of Table A3. Consistent with the analysis of the 
previous section, the correlations with RDD in this group reflect the extent 
to which instruments which are more senior, better secured, or in a safer 
tranches experience better performance of defaulted debt. The seniority 
rank (SR) and collateral rank (CR) codes both have negative and reasonably 
sized correlation coefficients with RDD, -9.6 percent and -10.0 percent for 
SR and CR, respectively. Percent debt below and percent debt above are 
positively (negatively) correlated to RDD, coefficients of 9.4 percent (-5.2 
percent). And the TSI, constructed from the latter two variables as detailed 
in the previous section, has a significant positive correlation with RDD of 9.7 
percent. TSI enters into two of our three candidate regression models.
In this section we consider macroeconomic/cyclical metrics measured 
near the default date of the obligor. These are shown in the second from 
bottom panel of Table A3. These correlations are evidence that defaulted 
debt returns vary counter-cyclically with respect to the credit cycle, or 
that debt defaulting in downturn periods tends to perform better. We 
have measures of the aggregate default rate, extracted from Moody’s 
Default Rate Service (DRS™) database. These are lagging 12-month de-
fault rates, with cohorts formed on an overlapping quarterly basis.15 The 
For example, the default rate for the fourth quarter of 2008 would represent the fraction  15 
of Moody’s rated issuers in the beginning of 4Q07 that defaulted over the subsequent 
year. We follow the practice of adjusting for withdrawn ratings by subtracting one-half the 
number of withdrawn obligors from the number of available-to-default (or the denominator 
of the default rate.)68
four versions of this are for the all-corporate and speculative grade seg-
ments, both in aggregate and by industry. All of these have a mild, albeit 
significant, positive linear correlations with RDD. The Moody’s All-Corpo-
rate Quarterly Default Rate (MACQDR), having a 6.7 percent correlation 
with RDD, is one of the systematic risk variables to enter the candidate 
regression models.
The next set of variables represent measures of aggregate equity and 
money market performance, the Fama and French (FF) portfolio returns 
commonly used in the finance literature, measured on a monthly basis in 
the month prior to instrument default.16 These are excess return on the 
market (FF-ERM), relative return on small stocks17 (FF-ERSS), and the rel-
ative return on value stocks18 (FF-ERVS). We see that RDD is somewhat 
positively associated with aggregate return on the market factor FF-ERM, 
having a modest correlation of 7.2 percent.19 Similarly, RDD is positively 
but weakly related to FF-RRSS, a correlation of only 2.8 percent. On the 
other hand, RDD seems to have a small negative correlation to FF-RRVS 
of -4.3 percent. We have one more aggregate equity market variable, 
two-year stock market volatility, defined as the standard deviation of the 
S&P 500 return in the two years prior to default, which shows a modest 
positive linear correlation to RDD of 5.7 percent. Note that FF-ERM is 
the only of these aggregate equity market variables to enter significantly 
in the multiple regression models. Another set of systematic variables 
are aggregate interest rates, the one-month treasury bill yield and the 
ten-year treasury bond yield, which exhibit moderate negative correlation 
to RDD of -10.2 percent and -7.0 percent, respectively. However, only 
the one-month treasury bill yield appears in the final regressions. The 
intuition here may be that defaulted debt performs better in low interest 
rate environments, which is associated with lower aggregate economic 
activity, as well as a higher marginal utility of consumption on the part of 
investors.20
The final set of variables that we consider in this section are duration/vin-
tage metrics, based on calculations from extracted dates in the MURD™ 
database. These are shown in the bottom panel of Table A3. We can 
conclude from this section that the duration/vintage measures that would 
be in one’s information set at the time of instrument default are largely 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Partial effect P-value Partial effect P-value Partial effect P-value
Intercept 0.3094 1.42E-03 0.5101 9.35E-04 0.4342 6.87E-03
Moody’s 12-month lagging speculative grade default rate by industry 2.0501 1.22E-02 2.2538 6.94E-03 2.1828 1.36E-02
Fama-French excess return on market factor 1.3814 8.73E-03 1.5085 6.35E-03 1.5468 9.35E-03
Collateral rank secured 0.2554 7.21E-03 0.2330 1.25E-02 0.2704 9.36E-04
Tranche safety index 0.4548 3.03E-02 0.4339 3.75E-02
Loss given default 0.3273 1.44E-02 0.2751 3.88E-02
Cumulative abnormal returns on equity prior to default 0.3669 1.51E-03 0.3843 1.00E-03 0.4010 9.39E-04
Total liabilities to total assets 0.2653 5.22E-08
Moody’s original rating investment grade 0.2118 2.80E-02 0.2422 6.84E-03 0.1561 6.25E-02
One-month treasury yield -0.4298 3.04E-02 -0.3659 1.01E-02 -0.4901 3.36E-02
Size relative to the market 0.0366 4.76E-02 0.0648 3.41E-03
Market value to book value 0.1925 2.64E-05 0.1422 5.63E-03
Free-asset ratio -0.2429 2.25E-02
Degrees of freedom 959 958 783
Log-likelihood -592.30 -594.71 -503.99
McFadden pseudo R-squared (in-sample) 32.48% 38.80% 41.73%
McFadden pseudo R-squared (out-of-sample) – bootstrap mean 21.23% 12.11% 17.77%
McFadden pseudo R-squared (out-of-sample) – bootstrap standard error 2.28% 1.16% 1.70%
Table 4 – Beta-link generalized linear model for annualized returns on defaulted debt1 (Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database 1987-2008)
1 – Annualized “return on defaulted debt” (RDD) from just after the time of default (first trading date of debt) until the time of ultimate resolution.
These can be downloaded from Kenneth French’s website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/ 16 
pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
This is more commonly termed the “small minus large” (SML) portfolio [Fama and French  17 
(1992)].
This is more commonly termed the “high minus low” (HML) portfolio, meaning high versus  18 
low book-to-market ratio [Fama and French (1992)].
Results for the S&P 500 return, not shown, are very similar. 19 
The term spread, or the difference in a long and short term treasury yield, was neither  20 
significant on a univariate basis nor in the regressions. This held across several different 
choices of term structures. Consequently, we do not show these results.69
uninformative regarding the performance of defaulted debt. The variables 
that we have chosen to display include time from origination to default, 
time from first rating to default, time from last cash pay date to default, 
time from default to emergence, and time from origination to maturity.
Multivariate regression analysis of defaulted debt 
returns
In this section, we discuss the construction and results of multiple regres-
sion models for RDD. In order to cope with the highly non-normal nature 
of the RDD distribution, we turn to the various techniques that have been 
employed in the finance and economics literature to classify data in mod-
els with constrained dependent variables, either qualitative or bounded 
in some region. However, much of the credit risk related literature has 
focused on qualitative dependent variables, which the case of probabil-
ity-of -default (PD) estimation naturally falls into. Maddala (1991, 1983) 
introduces, discusses, and formally compares the different generalized 
linear models (GLMs). Here we consider the case most relevant for RDD 
estimation, and the least pursued in the GLM literature. In this context, 
since we are dealing with a random variable in a bounded region, this is 
most conveniently modeled through employing a beta distribution. Con-
sequently, we follow Mallick and Gelfand (1994), in which the GLM link 
function21 is taken as a mixture of cumulative beta distributions, which we 
term the beta-link GLM (BLGLM) [see Jacobs and Karagozoglu (2011) for 
an application of the GLM model to estimating the ultimate LGD].
The coefficient estimates and diagnostic statistics for our “leading” three 
models are shown in Table 4. These are determined through a combina-
tion of automated statistical procedures22 and expert judgment, where 
we try to balance sometimes competing considerations of statistical 
quality of the estimates with the sensibility of the models. Essentially, the 
three models shown in Table 4 had the best fit to the sample data, while 
spanning what we thought was the best set of risk factors, based upon 
prior expectations as well as the univariate analysis. Note that there is 
much overlap between the models, as Model 2 differs from Model 1 by 
two variables (it has MV/BV instead of TL/TA, and has RSIZ), and Model 3 
from Model 2 by two variables (FAR in lieu of TSI and LGD).
Across the three candidate models, we observe that all coefficients esti-
mates attain a high degree of statistical significance, in almost all cases 
at better than the 5 percent level,23 and in many cases at much better 
than the 1 percent level. The number of observations for which we had 
all of these explanatory variables is the same for Models 1 and 2 (968), 
but there is a sizable drop-off for Model 3 to only 792 observations. In all 
cases, the likelihood functions converged to a stable global maximum.24 
Model 3 achieves the best in-sample fit by McFadden pseudo r-squared 
of 41.7 percent, followed by Model 2 (38.8 percent), and Model 1 (32.5 
percent). In terms of maximized log-likelihood, Model 3 is far better than 
the others (-504.0), and Model 1 is only slightly better than Model 2 
(-592.3 versus -594.7) in spite of having one less explanatory variable. 
However, as these models are not nested this may not be so meaningful 
a comparison. Overall, we deem these to signify good fit, given the non-
linearity of the problem, the relatively high dimension, as well as the high 
level of noise in the RDD variable.
We now turn to the signs and individual economic significance of the vari-
ables, note that we report partial effects (PEs), which are akin to straight 
coefficient estimates in an ordinary least squares regression. Roughly 
speaking, this represents a change in the dependent variable for a unit 
change in a covariate, holding other variables fixed at their average sam-
ple values.25
First, we consider the systematic risk variables. In the case of the Moody’s 
speculative default rate by industry, appearing in all models, we see PEs 
ranging in 2.05-2.25. This implies that a percentage point elevation in 
aggregate default rates adds about 2 percent in return on defaulted debt 
on average, all else equal, which can be considered highly significant in 
an economic sense. For example, the near quadrupling in default rates 
between 1996 and 2001 would imply an increase in expected RDD of 
about 12 percent. On the other hand, the PEs on the one-month treasury 
yield are in the range of -0.49 to -0.37, so that debt defaulting when 
short-term rates are about 2 percent higher will experience close to 1 
percent deterioration in performance, ceteris paribus. Second, across all 
three regression models, RDD has a significant (at the 5 percent level) 
and positive loading on the FF-ERM, with PEs ranging from 1.38 to 1.55, 
implying that a 5 percent increase in the aggregate equity market return 
augments defaulted debt returns by about 6 percent.
Next, we consider the contractual variables. The dummy variable for se-
cured collateral has PEs ranging in 0.23-0.27 across models, suggesting 
that the presence of any kind of security can be expected to augment 
expected RDD by about 25 percent, which is an economically significant 
result. The TSI, appearing only in Models 1 and 2, has a PE ranging in 
0.43-0.45, suggesting that going up a single decile in this measure can 
increase RDD by anywhere between 4 percent to 5 percent.
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In the terminology of GLMs, the link function connects the expectation of some function  21 
of the data (usually the random variable weighted by density, in the case of the expected 
value) to a linear function of explanatory variables.
To this end, we employ an alternating direction stepwise model selection algorithm in the  22 
mass() library of R statistical software. There were five candidate leading models that were 
tied as best, we eliminated two of them that we judged to have economically unreasonable 
features.
Moody’s investment grade rating in Model 3 is on the borderline, having a p-value of 0.06,  23 
just shy of significance at the 5 percent level.
The estimation was performed in S+ 8.0 using built-in optimization routines. 24 
See Maddala (1981) for a discussion of this concept in the context of probit and logit  25 
regressions.70
Turning to the credit quality/market variables, for LGD at default, only in 
Models 1 and 2, PEs are about 0.28-0.33, implying that a 10 percent low-
er expected recovery rate by the market at default can lead to about a 3 
percent higher expected RDD. The dummy variable for a Moody’s invest-
ment grade rating at origination, appearing in all models, has PEs ranging 
from 0.16 in Model 3 to 0.24 in Model 2. This tells us that “fallen angels” 
are expected to have about 15-25 percent better return on their defaulted 
debt. On the other hand, the single relative stock price performance vari-
able CAR, in all three models, has PEs ranging in 0.37-0.40. This says 
that, for example, a firm with 10 percent better price performance relative 
to the market in the 90 days prior to default will experience about 4 per-
cent better return on its defaulted debt.
In the case of the financial ratios, TL/TA appears only in Model 1, hav-
ing a PE of 0.27. This means that the debt of a defaulted firm having 10 
percent higher leverage at default will have about 3 percent greater return 
on its debt. MV/BV appears in Models 2 and 3, with respective PEs of 
0.19 and 0.14, so that a 10 percent higher market valuation translate on 
average into nearly a 2 percent better return on defaulted debt. Finally in 
this group, the cashflow measure FAR only appears in Model 3, with a PE 
of -0.24. This implies that if a defaulted firm has 10 percent greater cash 
generating ability by this measure, then holding other factors constant its 
RDD should return about 2.5 percent less.
Finally, the size of the firm relative to the market appears in only Models 2 
and 3, with PEs of about 0.06 to 0.04. As this is in logarithmic terms, we 
interpret this as if a defaulted firm doubles in relative market capitaliza-
tion, we should expect its RDD to be augmented by around 5 percent, all 
other factors being held constant.
In order to settle upon a “favored” or “leading” model, we perform an 
out-of-sample and out-of-time analysis. We reestimate the models for 
different subsamples of the available data, starting from the middle of 
the dataset in year 1996. We then evaluate how the model predicts the 
realized RDD a year ahead. We employ a resampling procedure (a “non-
parametric bootstrap”), sampling randomly with replacement from the 
development dataset (i.e., the period 1987-1996), and in each iteration 
reestimating the model. Then from the year ahead, we resample with 
replacement (i.e., the 1997 cohort), and evaluate the goodness-of-fit for 
the model. This is performed 1000 times, then a year is added, and this is 
repeated until the sample is exhausted. At the end of the procedure, we 
collect the r-squareds, and study their distribution for each of the three 
models. The results of this show that the mean out-of-sample r-squared 
in Model 1 is highest, at 21.2 percent, followed by Model 3 (17.8 percent), 
and Model 2 (12.1 percent). On the basis of the numerical standard er-
rors (on the order of 1-2 percent), we deem these to be significantly dis-
tinct. Given the best performance on this basis, in conjunction with other 
considerations, we decide that Model 1 is the best. The other reasons 
for choosing Model 1 are its parsimony relative to Model 2, and that it 
contains a credit market variable (LGD), the latter we believe makes for 
a more compelling story. Note that this procedure is robust to structural 
breaks, as the model is redeveloped over an economic cycle, in each 
iteration the same variables are chosen, and the models display the same 
relative performance over time.
Finally, in Table 5, we evaluate the economic significance of these results. 
We formulate a trading strategy as follows. At the time of default, if fore-
casted returns according to the model over the expected time-to-resolution 
exceed cumulative excess of returns equity in the three months prior to de-
fault, then we form a long position in the debt, else we form a short position 
on the defaulted instrument. Abnormal excess returns are then measured 
relative to a market model (3-factor Fama-French) from the time of default 
to resolution. The results show excess abnormal returns, in this defaulted 
debt trading experiment, of around 5-6 percent (2-3 percent) assuming 
zero (1bp per month) round-trip transaction costs. These are statistically 
significant, and understandably lower and having higher p-values when we 
factor in transaction costs. Also, results are not highly differentiated across 
models, with Model 3 performing about 1 percent better assuming no 
transaction costs, and Model 1 having a similar margin of outperformance 
relative to the other models assuming transaction costs. Given that the lat-
ter is arguably a more realistic scenario, we still favor Model 1 because it 
generates superior excess returns in this trading strategy.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value
Zero transaction costs 0.0051 3.65E-03 0.0049 2.79E-04 0.0062 1.98E-03
1 bp per month round trip transaction costs 0.0032 7.76E-02 0.0019 7.90E-03 0.0025 6.45E-02
Table 5 – Excess abnormal trading returns1 of beta-link generalized linear model for annualized returns on defaulted debt2 (Moody’s Ultimate Recovery 
Database 1987-2008)
1 –   We formulate a trading strategy as follows. At the time of default, if forecasted returns according to the model over the expected time-to-resolution in excess of returns of returns on equity in 
the three months prior to default are positive (negative), then we form a long (short) position in the debt. Abnormal excess returns are then measured relative to a market model (3-factor Fama-
French) from the time of default to resolution.
2 –   Annualized “return on defaulted debt” (RDD) from just after the time of default (first trading date of debt) until the time of ultimate resolution.71
Conclusion
In this paper, we have empirically studied the market performance of a 
long history of defaulted debt. We examined the distributional properties 
of the return on defaulted debt (RDD) measure across different segmen-
tations in the dataset (i.e., default type, facility type, time period, senior-
ity, industry), and developed multiple regression models for RDD in the 
generalized linear model (GLM) class.
We found that defaulted debt returns vary significantly according to cer-
tain different factors. There is some evidence that RDD is elevated for 
debt having better collateral quality rank or better protected tranches 
within the capital structure; and for obligors rated higher at origination, 
larger in market capitalization relative to the market, more financially le-
vered, or having higher cumulative abnormal returns on equity (CARs) 
at default. However, RDD is increasing in market implied loss severity 
at default (loss given default – LGD). We also find evidence that returns 
vary countercyclically, as they are positively correlated with industry de-
fault rates. Furthermore, they are inversely related to short-term interest 
rates, and positively related to returns on the equity market. We identify 
a leading econometric model of RDD that performs well out-of-time and 
out-of sample. Finally, we document the economic significance of these 
results through excess abnormal returns, in a debt-equity arbitrage trad-
ing experiment, of around 5-6 percent (2-3 percent) assuming zero (1bp 
per month) round-trip transaction costs.
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Bankruptcy Out-of-court Total
Cnt Average
Std Err of 
the mean Minimum Maximum Cnt Average
Std Err of 
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28.32% 3.47% -100.00% 893.76%
59
45.11% 19.57% -91.87% 846.73%
1131
29.19% 3.44% -100.00% 893.76%
Time-to-
resolution2 1.7263 0.0433 0.0027 9.0548 6.65% 3.33% 0.27% 144.38% 1.6398 0.0425 0.0000 9.0548
Principal at 
default3 207,581 9,043 163 4,600,000 416,751 65,675 6,330 2,250,000 218,493 9,323 0 4,600,000
Bonds RDD
837
25.44% 3.75% -100.00% 893.76%
47
44.22% 21.90% -91.87% 846.73%
884
26.44% 3.74% -100.00% 893.76%
Time-to-
resolution2 1.4089 0.0436 0.0548 9.0548 0.2044 0.0786 0.0027 1.4438 1.3194 0.0427 0.0027 9.0548
Principal at 
default3 205,028 10,590 0 4,000,000 432,061 72,727 6,330 2,250,000 207,647 10,325 0 4,000,000
Revolvers RDD
250
26.93% 7.74% -100.00% 893.76%
17
10.32% 4.61% -0.04% 61.18%
267
25.88% 7.26% -100.00% 893.76%
Time-to-
resolution2 1.4089 0.0798 0.0548 9.0548 0.0027 0.0000 0.0027 0.0027 1.3194 0.0776 0.0027 9.0548
Principal at 
default3 205,028 19,378 0 4,000,000 246,163 78,208 32,000 1,250,000 207,647 18,786 0 4,000,000
Loans RDD
485
32.57% 5.71% -100.00% 893.76%
29
26.161% 18.872% -91.87% 532.76%
514
32.21% 5.49% -100.00% 893.76%
Time-to-
resolution2 1.4089 0.0548 0.0027 9.0548 18.12% 9.96% 0.0027 2.8959 1.2458 0.0743 0.0027 9.0548
Principal at 
default3 193,647 11,336 0 4,000,000 291,939 78,628 24,853 1,750,000 199,192 16,088 0 4,000,000
Total RDD
1322
28.05% 3.17% -100.00% 893.76%
76
37.33% 15.29% -91.87% 846.73%
1398
28.56% 3.11% -100.00% 893.76%
Time-to-
resolution2 1.6663 0.0384 0.0027 9.0548 0.0522 0.0260 0.0000 1.4438 1.5786 0.0376 0.0000 9.0548
Principal at 























































1.6982 0.0253 0.0027 9.3151
433
0.2084 0.0261 0.0027 3.8767
3231
1.4986 0.0239 0.0027 9.3151
Principal at 




48.57% 0.83% -69.78% 100.00%
345
14.50% 1.37% -27.66% 100.00%
2507
43.83% 0.78% -69.78% 100.00%
Time-to-
resolution2 1.7786 0.0290 0.0027 9.3151 0.2084 0.0292 0.0027 3.8767 1.5620 0.0275 0.0027 9.3151
Principal at 




39.47% 1.47% -69.78% 100.00%
117
18.00% 2.76% -3.58% 100.00%
819
36.40% 1.35% -69.78% 100.00%
Time-to-
resolution4 1.3944 0.1062 0.0027 9.0548 0.1490 0.0476 0.0027 2.8959 1.2165 0.0407 0.0027 9.0548
Principal at 




40.03% 1.08% -69.78% 100.00%
205
17.20% 2.03% -27.66% 100.00%
1543
37.00% 0.99% -69.78% 100.00%
Time-to-
resolution4 1.4089 0.0330 0.0027 9.0548 0.1812 0.0375 0.0027 2.8959 1.2458 0.0309 0.0027 9.0548
Principal at 




45.31% 0.66% -69.78% 100.00%
550
15.25% 1.13% -27.66% 100.00%
4050
41.23% 0.61% -69.78% 100.00%
Time-to-
resolution4 1.6373 0.0221 0.0027 9.3151 0.1958 0.0026 0.0027 3.8767 1.4415 0.0208 0.0027 9.3151
Principal at 
default5 146,057 4,064 0 4,600,000 187,615 13,576 0 3,000,000 151,701 3,972 0 4,600,000
1 – “Return on defaulted debt”: annualized simple rate of return on defaulted debt from just after the time of default (first trading date of debt) until the time of ultimate resolution.
2 – Total instrument outstanding at default.
3 – The time in years from the instrument default date to the time of ultimate recovery.
Table A1 – Characteristics of return on defaulted debt (RDD)1 observations by default and instrument type (Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database 1987-2010)73
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Guarantees 2 -96.0 4.0 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 2 -96.0 4.0
Oil and gas properties 2 77.5 68.3 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 2 77.5 68.3
Inventory and 
accounts receivable
28 20.2 23.4 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 28 20.2 23.4
Accounts receivable 5 24.5 28.5 2 23.9 40.6 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 7 24.4 21.6
Cash 2 114.8 17.0 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 2 114.8 17.0
Inventory 1 -100.0 N/A 1 29.3 N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 2 -35.3 64.7
Most assets 6 25.6 30.4 1 161.5 N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 1 72.1 N/A 8 48.4 28.1
Equipment 1 -100.0 N/A 17 41.9 8.9 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 18 34.0 11.5
All assets 363 32.4 6.9 36 33.4 23.8 1 86.5 N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 400 32.6 6.6
Real estate 4 132.0 73.6 2 63.8 110.9 0 N/A N/A 1 57.4 N/A 0 N/A N/A 7 101.8 48.3
All non-current assets 2 -41.7 58.3 3 -60.7 35.1 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 5 -53.1 27.0
Capital stock 36 40.0 15.4 38 65.2 19.1 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 74 52.9 12.3
PP&E 8 106.0 70.7 17 6.9 17.4 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 25 38.6 26.3
Second lien 21 23.2 26.8 17 24.1 18.4 1 119.6 N/A 1 -46.0 N/A 0 N/A N/A 40 24.3 16.2
Other 0 N/A N/A 1 -24.7 N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 1 -24.7 N/A
Unsecured 32 19.8 7.9 3 -27.7 36.6 452 23.7 4.9 158 31.0 10.2 117 15.7 11.1 762 23.6 4.0
Third lien 1 106.1 N/A 1 4.9 N/A 7 3.5 22.3 1 439.4 N/A 2 -21.8 2.5 12 44.3 39.2
Intellectual property 0 N/A N/A 2 28.6 43.9 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 2 28.6 43.9





























39 22.6 18.2 2 23.9 40.6 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 41 22.6 17.4
Inventory, most assets 
and equipment
8 -5.8 30.3 19 47.5 10.2 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 1 72.1 N/A 28 33.2 11.7
All assets and real 
estate
367 33.5 6.9 38 35.0 22.9 1 86.5 N/A 1 57.4 N/A 0 N/A N/A 407 33.8 6.6
Non-current assets 
and capital stock
38 35.7 15.0 41 56.0 18.6 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 79 46.2 12.0
PPE and second lien 29 46.1 27.6 35 14.3 12.3 1 119.6 N/A 1 -46.0 N/A 0 N/A N/A 66 29.0 13.9
Unsecured & Other 
Illiquid Collateral
33 22.4 8.1 7 17.4 28.5 459 23.4 4.8 159 33.6 10.4 119 15.1 10.9 777 24.1 3.9
Total unsecured 32 19.8 7.9 3 27.7 36.6 452 23.7 4.9 158 31.0 10.2 117 15.7 11.1 762 23.6 4.0
Total secured 482 33.0 5.8 139 38.0 9.1 9 25.6 22.6 3 150.3 147.6 3 9.5 31.4 636 34.5 4.9
Total collateral 514 32.2 5.5 161 36.6 8.4 461 23.7 4.8 161 33.2 10.3 120 15.6 10.8 1398 28.6 3.1
Table A2 – Return on defaulted debt (RDD1) by seniority ranks and collateral types (Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database 1987-2010)
1 – Annualized “return on defaulted debt” from the time of default until the time of ultimate resolution.74














































Book value total liabilities/book value total assets 1106 38.00% 115.00% 137.42% 392.00% 2.33% 17.20% 4.32E-04
Market-to-book (market value assets/book value 
assets)
1106 44.00% 123.00% 152.61% 673.00% 2.71% 18.50% 6.34E-05
Intangibles ratio (book value intangibles/book value 
assets)
773 0.00% 18.34% 21.02% 87.85% 0.75% 11.91% 4.20E-04
Free asset ratio 941 -95.51% 9.24% 5.89% 95.86% 1.18% -8.97% 2.34E-03
Free cash flow/book value of total assets 1006 -107.64% -1.41% -10.77% 34.61% 0.70% -2.42% 6.11E-04
Cash flow from operations/book value of total assets 1014  (669.12)  (0.48)  57.09  7,778.00 30.65 -3.32% 8.33E-04
Retained earnings/book value of total assets 1031 -757.97% -25.80% -61.21% 56.32% 3.01% -5.91% 1.47E-03
Return on assets 1031 -159.12% -8.52% -22.18% 36.35% 0.92% -6.50% 1.62E-03

























One-year expected return on equity 1106 -132.00% -80.00% -72.40% 161.00% 1.26% -6.42% 1.07E-03
One-month equity price volatility 1106 13.00% 209.00% 259.49% 6116.00% 11.18% 2.48% 1.14E-04
Relative size (market cap of firm to the market) 1106 -17.3400 -12.7200% -13.0487 -6.9300 0.0599 8.60% 1.31E-03
Relative stock price (percentile ranking to market) 1106 0.47% 11.00% 13.76% 81.00% 0.42% -4.36% 1.05E-03
Stock price trading range (ratio of current to 3 Yr 
high/low)
1106 0.00% 0.71% 2.95% 88.00% 0.22% -2.92% 7.02E-04


















Number of instruments 4050 0.0000 6.0000 9.9511 80.0000 0.1938 -4.04% 5.07E-04
Number of creditor classes 4050 0.0000 2.0000 2.4669 7.0000 0.0188 -2.98% 3.74E-04
Percent secured debt 4050 0.00% 47.79% 47.13% 100.00% 0.56% 8.76% 1.10E-03
Percent bank debt 4050 0.00% 44.53% 45.23% 100.00% 0.54% 9.44% 1.19E-03





























Altman Z-score 793 -8.5422 0.3625 -0.3258 4.6276 0.0804 -8.75% 2.49E-03
LGD at default 1433 -8.50% 59.00% 55.05% 99.87% 0.83% -11.28% 2.38E-04
Moody’s original credit rating investment grade 
dummy
3297 0.0000 0.0000 0.2014 1.0000 0.0070 12.40% 2.37E-04























Seniority rank 4050 1.0000 1.5000 1.7262 7.0000 0.0142 -9.60% 2.28E-04
Collateral rank 4050 1.0000 6.0000 4.5879 6.0000 0.0254 -10.00% 5.29E-04
Percent debt below 4050 0.00% 9.92% 25.89% 100.00% 0.48% 9.36% 1.18E-03
Percent debt above 4050 0.00% 0.00% 21.41% 100.00% 0.45% -5.16% 6.48E-04















Moody’s all-corporate quarterly default rate 1322 0.00% 7.05% 7.14% 13.26% 0.09% 6.68% 1.47E-03
Moody’s speculative quarterly default rate 1322 1.31% 7.05% 7.16% 13.26% 0.09% 6.40% 1.41E-03
Fama-French excess return on market factor 4050 -1076.00% 77.00% 31.06% 1030.00% 7.20% 7.22% 3.02E-04
Fama-French relative return on small stocks factor 4050 -2218.00% 31.00% 20.15% 843.00% 6.00% 2.81% 3.52E-04
Fama-French excess return on value stock factor 4050 -912.00% 54.00% 79.35% 1380.00% 5.75% -4.27% 5.35E-04
Short-term interest rates (1-month treasury yields) 1322 6.00% 32.00% 31.75% 79.00% 0.46% -10.22% 2.26E-03
Long-term interest rates (10-month treasury yields) 1106 332.00% 535.00% 538.42% 904.00% 3.61% -7.00% 1.69E-03



















Time from origination to default 3521 0.2500 2.9096 4.0286 29.9534 0.0631 0.57% 7.68E-05
Time from last cash-pay date to default 4050 0.0000 0.2384 0.3840 4.3808 0.0075 4.49% 5.63E-04
Time from default to resolution 4050 0.0027 1.1534 1.4415 9.3151 0.0208 -13.41% 1.70E-03
Time from origination to maturity date 3521 0.1000 7.5890 8.9335 50.0329 0.1111 -0.85% 1.14E-04
Table A3 – Summary statistics on selected variables and correlations with RDD1 (Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database 1987-2010)
1 – Annualized “return on defaulted debt” (RDD) from just after the time of default (first trading date of debt) until the time of ultimate resolution.